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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The question presented for review is whether the language of
Section 77-27-10(2) prevents the Board of Pardons from ordering any
parolee to complete an extended period of intensive sexual therapy
at a of community correctional centers as a "special condition of
parole."
The applicable standard of review is well-settled:
On appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, "we survey
the record in the light most favorable to the findings and
judgment; and we will not reverse if there is a reasonable
basis therein to support the trial court's refusal to be
convinced that the writ should be granted."
Webb v. Van Per Veur, 853 P.2d 898 (Utah App. 1993) (citing cases) .
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER OP DISMISSAL
On January 5, 1994, Judge Frank G. Noel of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah issued an order
dismissing Petitioner/Appellant Nicholas V. Banner's Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus as being "frivolous on its face" for the
following reasons:
The provision of the Utah Code relied upon by Petitioner is
not a limitation on the Board's authority except insofar as
it requires the Board [of Pardons] to order, at a minimum,
outpatient therapy. The Board is also required to exercise
its judgment in such a way as to reasonably protect the community and to assist the offender to lead a law-abiding life.
The references provision of the code in no way prevents the
Board from ordering inpatient treatment as a condition of
parole.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
from the denial of the petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant
to §78-2a-2(g), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case
This case is about power. The State of Utah has plenary power
subject only to the limitations based upon its powers by the State
and Federal Constitutions. The Board of Pardons is an independent
board with both constitutional and statutory powers. Those powers
are plenary within its realm of responsibility subject only to the
limitations based on the State and Federal Constitutions. Pursuant
to those powers, the Utah Board of Pardons established the policy
or practice of paroling criminal offenders to community corrections
centers for the purpose of completing intensive sex therapy.
The Courts have determined that Utah's Parole Release Statute
does not create any liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because that statutory
scheme does not contain the substantive statutory predicates that
would require to the Board of Pardons to parole a criminal offender
if the conditions were met. Instead, Utah's parole release scheme
provides the Utah Board of Pardons the discretion to decide when to
parole any criminal offender under their jurisdiction.

2

Petitioner/Appellant Nicholas V. Banner filed a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that the clear and unambiguous language of § 77-2710(2), Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, contains a substantive
predicate [whenever a sexual offender is released on parole], that
affects his liberty interests and contains the mandatory language
["shall"] requiring the Utah Board of Pardons to order "outpatient
sexual counseling and therapy" as a condition of his parole. Once
the Board decides to release an offender on parole, that predicate
triggers the Board's duty to impose "outpatient sexual counseling
and therapy" as a condition of the sex offender's parole.
Petitioner/Appellant alleges that the Utah Board of Pardon's
policy or practice of paroling sexual offenders to the community
corrections center to complete additional sexual therapy programs
directly conflicts with the clear statutory language of § 77-2710(2) and the Board of Pardons violates the civil rights of sex
offenders by violating the clear and unambiguous language of that
statute.
Petitioner/Appellant does not dispute that the Utah Department
of Corrections can release inmates to community corrections centers
[also known as "halfway houses"] to complete additional, intensive
sex therapy programs. The halfway house concept includes providing
inmates the opportunity to enter a halfway house as a intermediate
step between in-cell incarceration and release to parole. However,
3

once the Board of Pardons paroles the sexual offender, §77-27-10(2)
requires the Board of Pardons order "outpatient sexual counseling
and treatment" as a condition of the sex offender's parole and does
not empower them to parole sex offenders to inpatient residential
treatment centers for additional sex therapy.
Nor does this Petitioner/Appellant argue that the Legislature
of the State of Utah would not have the power to allow the Utah
Board of Pardons to parole sex offenders to inpatient residential
treatment centers for additional sex therapy. Petitioner/Appellant
does argue that the Legislature has not yet acted to do so.
The practical effects of the Utah Board of Pardons' policy or
practice of paroling inmates to halfway houses are that the Pardons
Board has delegated power to determine whether sexual offenders
meet program requirements to sexual therapists and treatment teams
and allows them to determine when to violate sex offenders' paroles
if their program requirements are not met. This results in another
form of "swinging door" because the shortage of beds causes sexual
therapists and treatment teams to recommend parole revocations that
they might not otherwise recommend in order to make room for other
sex offenders that the Board of Pardons has elected to parole to
the community corrections centers. The Board of Pardons gives the
sex therapist and treatment teams considerable deference to their
professional psychological expertise. As a practical matter, sex
4

offenders who need the sexual therapy are routinely having their
paroles violated by sex therapists and treatment teams because the
State of Utah has failed or refused to provide sufficient financial
resources to the community corrections centers and because the Utah
Board of Pardons' intentional decision to ignore the mandates of
§ 77-27-10(2) results in decisions to remove sex offenders from a
sex therapy program at a community correction center and are then
treated that removal as a violation of the sex offender's parole.
Since numerous sex offenders are paroled to community corrections
centers for therapy, are removed, are later re-paroled to community
corrections centers, and are removed again, the Board's policy or
practice of paroling sex offenders to community corrections centers
is having an extremely adverse impact on the future possibility of
parole for those offenders.
Course of the Case and Disposition Below
The Utah Board of Pardons paroled the Petitioner/Appellant,
Nicholas V. Banner, to the Freemont Community Corrections Center,
2588 West 2365 So., West Valley City, Utah 84119, and ordered him
to satisfactorily complete the sex therapy program at the Freemont
Community Corrections Center as a condition of his parole.
Petitioner/Appellant, believing the Board of Pardon's "special
condition" requiring him to be reincarcerated to a halfway house
for intensive "in-patient sexual therapy" as the condition of his
5

parole when § 77-27-10(2) mandates the imposition of "outpatient
mental health counseling and treatment" as a

condition of his

parole, sought to have that discrepancy resolved by Assistant
Attorney General Kirk Torgensen and by the Utah Board of Pardons,
and thereby, exhausted his state administrative remedies.

See

Addendum A, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus attached hereto and
incorporated herein, pp. 3-4, paragraphs 6-10 and Exhibits thereto.
In response thereto, Petitioner/Appellant received a letter
dated 29 November 1993 from Assistant Attorney General James H.
Beadles, stating that § 77-27-10(2) "sets a minimum (outpatient
therapy) but does not restrict the Board from going beyond that
minimal requirement in certain cases." See Exhibit 5, attached to
Addendum A, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
On December 10, 1993, Petitioner/Appellant wrote a letter to
Michael R. Sibbett, Chairman for the Utah State Board of Pardons
complaining inter

alia

that the Board's policy/custom of paroling

sex offenders to community corrections centers for sexual therapy
was inconsistent with laws of the State of Utah, including § 77-2710(2) . See Exhibit 6, attached to Addendum A, Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
On December 22, 1993, John Green, Administrative Coordinator,
Utah Board of Pardons, answered the letter that was addressed to
Chairman Michael R. Sibbett.

Once again, Mr. Green claimed that
6

the language of §77-27-10(2) sets a minimum statutory requirement
in sex offender cases," but claims that "the Board has the discretion to require additional sex offender therapy as a condition of
parole beyond the minimum stated in the statute."
Thereafter, Petitioner/Appellant filed his Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus, alleging inter

alia

that the Board's policy or

custom of paroling sex offenders to Community Corrections Centers
with the condition that they successfully complete sexual offender
therapy, subjected Petitioner/Appellant to a "flagrant violation of
his constitutionally protected liberty interest in obtaining parole
release" subject to the conditions set by § 77-27-10(2).
On January 5, 1994, the Honorable Judge Frank G. Noel ordered
Petitioner/Appellant's Petition dismissed as being frivolous on its
face for the following reasons:
The provision of the Utah Code relied upon by Petitioner is
not a limitation on the Board's authority except insofar as
it requires the Board [of Pardons] to order, at a minimum,
outpatient therapy. The Board is also required to exercise
its judgment in such a way as to reasonably protect the community and to assist the offender to lead a law-abiding life.
The references provision of the code in no way prevents the
Board [of Pardons] from ordering inpatient treatment as a
condition of parole.

7

Statement of Facts
1.

Petitioner/Appellant Nicholas Vaughn Banner is a citizen

of the State of Utah, and is impecunious.
2. The Utah Board of Pardons ordered Petitioner/Appellant to
satisfactorily complete the sexual therapy program at the Freemont
Community Corrections Center, 2588 West 2365 So., West Valley City,
Utah 84119, as a condition of his parole.
3.

The Freemont Community Corrections Center is operated by

the Utah State Department of Corrections.
4. Respondent Utah Board of Pardons is empowered by the State
of Utah with the authority to decide when and under what conditions
Petitioner may be released from incarceration, subject to Title 77,
Chapter 27, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and other laws of
the State of Utah.
5. Petitioner/Appellant's writ of habeas corpus included the
documentation regarding his criminal convictions and the sentences
imposed upon him.

See APPENDIX ONE, Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus, attached to Docketing Statement and incorporated therein
by reference, at page 2 paragraph 4.
6. Effective December 14, 1993, the Petitioner/Appellant was
ordered by Respondent Utah Board of Pardons to "be paroled from the
punishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him." See APPENDIX
ONE, at page 2 paragraph 5, attached to the Docketing Statement and
APPENDIX TWO, Order of Parole, attached to the Docketing Statement.
8

7.

Section 77-27-1(8), UCA 1953 as amended defines the term

"parole" as "release from incarceration on prescribed conditions
which, if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, entitles him to
a termination of sentence."
8. Petitioner/Appellant agreed to abide by all the conditions
of parole set forth in his Parole Agreement and several additional
conditions set forth by the Utah Board of Pardons insofar as they
are "consistent with the laws of the State of Utah."
9. The first "special condition" set by Respondent Utah Board
of Pardons was that Petitioner\Appellant enter and "successfully
complete Halfway House Program."

See APPENDIX ONE, Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus at page 2-3, paragraph 6 and APPENDIX TWO,
Parole Agreement.
10. The Halfway House Program referred to in Appellant's first
special condition is a 12 month intensive inpatient sexual offender
program conducted at community-based state correctional facilities
that are known as "Community Correctional Centers."
11. Shortly after Petitioner/Appellant arrived at the Freemont
Community Correctional Center, he was required to sign a Community
Corrections Center Program Agreement that says:
Residence at this Center is a continuation of your period of
confinement which is prescribed by law and which was ordered
by one or more STATE COURTS and/or the BOARD of PARDONS....

9

12.

Section 77-27-10(2), Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended, says:
If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to
violate Section . . . 76-5-404.1 . . . [the Section that
the Petitioner/Appellant was convicted of violating], is
released on parole, the board [of Pardons] shall order
outpatient mental health counseling and treatment as a
condition of parole (emphasis added).

13.

Chapter 27 of Title 77 does not distinguish between or

define the terminology
treatment"

"outpatient mental health counseling and

[from § 77-27-10(2)] or "inpatient" sex therapy [from

the community correctional center sexual therapy program] . But,
in State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, at 271 (Utah App. 1990), the
statement of facts included the statement that an Adult Probation
and Parole agent had described Community Corrections Centers as an
"inpatient facility operated by the Department of Corrections."
Also

see

§ 62A-2-101(16), which defines "[o]utpatient treatment" as

individual, family, or group therapy or counseling designed
to improve or enhance social or psychological functioning
for those whose physical and emotional status allows them
to continue functioning in their usual living environment,
(emphasis added).
14.

Petitioner/Appellant, believing the "special condition"

requiring him to be reincarcerated to a halfway house for intensive
"in-patient sexual therapy" as the condition of his parole when the
language of § 77-27-10(2) mandates imposition of "outpatient mental
health counseling and treatment" as one condition of his parole,
sought to have that discrepancy resolved by then Assistant Attorney
General, Kirk Torgensen, and by the Utah Board of Pardons, and thus
10

exhausted his state administrative remedies. Addendum A, Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus attached hereto and incorporated herein,
pp. 3-4, paragraphs 6 to 10 and the Exhibits thereto.
15. Petitioner/Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
asked the Court to decide whether imposition of "inpatient" sexual
therapy and treatment for a year or more as a special condition of
his parole is unlawful in light of mandatory language of § 77-2710(2) that requires the Utah Board of Pardons to impose "outpatient
mental health counseling and treatment" as a condition of parole.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The broad constitutional and statutory powers of the Utah
State Board of Pardons are limited by provisions of both state and
federal constitutions.

Article VII, Section 12(2)(a) of the Utah

Constitution empowers the Legislature to set condition upon which
the Board of Pardons may grant parole and subjects the Board's
parole powers to regulations as provided by statute.
Petitioner/Appellant alleges that the clear and unambiguous
language of § 77-27-10(2) required the District Court to interpret
the statute without looking behind the language of the statute in
an attempt to divine the meaning of that language.

Although the

Legislature has plenary powers over many areas of state government
and clearly could empower the Board of Pardons to parole inmates to
community corrections centers, the Legislature has not yet acted to
11

empower the Board to do so. The Utah Court of Appeals must not let
the Board of Pardons assume that power without constitutional and
statutory authority, particularly in the face of a statute that
acts to limit their otherwise broad powers to do so.
The mandatory language of § 77-27-10(2), combined with the
Parole Board's decision to parole a sexual offender, implicates
a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

Once such a liberty interest arises,

federal, not state, law determines what process is due. Where the
provision that creates the protectable interest also deprives the
Board of Pardons of the jurisdiction to order any parole condition
that is contrary to the condition mandated by the State Legislature
pursuant to its plenary powers, subjecting a parolee to conditions
that conflict with the legislature's statutory mandate violates the
parolee's rights under substantive due process.

The substantive

due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment acts as a bar to
certain arbitrary government actions regardless of the fairness of
procedures used to implement them.

See Daniels v. Williams, 474

U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).

12

ARGUMENT
I.

THE PLENARY POWERS OF GOVERNMENT

Unless limited by either the federal or state constitution,
the theoretical power of the state legislature is nearly absolute.
See Bruce C. Hafen, The Legislative Branch in Utah, 1966 Utah Law
Review 416, 417 (September 1966), citing Rio Grande Lumber Co. v.
Darke, 167 P.2d 241 (1917).
"plenary power."

The Model State Constitution calls it

See the National Municipal League, Model State

Constitution §4.01, comment (6th ed. 1963). The Utah Supreme Court
describes the legislative power:
Our legislature is directly representative of the people of
the sovereign state, and thus has inherently all of the powers
of government except as otherwise specified by the State Constitution. . . . Therefore, it can do any act or perform any function not specifically prohibited by the State Constitution.
Wood v. Budge, 13 Utah 2d 359, 363, 374 P.2d 516 (Utah 1962).
It is well settled that in the exercise of its police power,
a state can enact regulations or laws reasonably necessary to
secure the health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare
of the community....
George v. Oren Ltd. & Associates, 672 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1983).
Like the State Legislature, the Board of Pardons is a body
with both constitutional and statutory powers. But the authority
of the Utah Board of Pardons is not absolute and yields to state
or federal constitutional provisions.

The Utah Board of Pardons

has similarly broad discretionary powers.

Court decisions about

Utah's parole release procedures have not identified substantive
limitations on the Board's discretionary release powers.
13

Absent statutory language which limits a parole board's
discretion, which is the case in Utah [Utah Code Ann,
§ 77-27-5 (1990)1, there is no federally protected liberty
interest in parole release [See e.g. Greenholtz v. Inmates
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979)] nor is there an expectation of parole afforded by the federal constitution [Id.].
Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991).
[Ujnder the Utah indeterminate sentencing system, the statute
under which a defendant is convicted of, for example, a first
degree felony, sets the time of imprisonment as a range, five
years to life. If the trial judge sends the defendant to
prison, the judge does not determine the number of years the
defendant will spend there. That is left to the unfettered
discretion of the board of pardons...
Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991) .
However, once the Utah Board of Pardons has extended parole
to a sex offender, § 77-27-10(2) UCA clearly places a substantive
limitation on the Board of Pardons' discretion. At that point the
Legislative mandate is clear.

It shall order "outpatient mental

health and counseling" as a condition of parole.
II.

THE PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Well established principles of statutory interpretation and
construction exist to provide guidance to the Courts
Judicial responsibility to construe statutes must not be
confused with legislative responsibility to enact them.
Expanding the express language used by the legislature in
this case ... would improperly exceed the limits of our
judicial responsibility.
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993)
[Courts] have nothing to do with what the law ought to be.
[They] must be guided by the law as it is. We cannot by
construction liberalize the statute and enlarge its pro14

visions. When language is clear and unambiguous, it must
be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for
construction.
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993), citing Hanchett
v. Burbidcre, 59 Utah 127, 135, 202 P.2d 377, 380 (Utah 1921).
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, appellate
courts cannot look beyond the language to divine legislative
intent, but must construe the statute according to its plain
language.
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993), citing State v.
Singh, 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied,
832 P.2d
476 (Utah 1992); Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah
1989); and Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction at
§ 4601 (5th ed. 1992) (if meaning of statute is plain, the "sole
function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms").
Further, courts typically construe statutes on the assumption
that "each term is used advisedly and that the intent of the
Legislative is revealed in the use of the term in the context

and structure

in which it is

placed.

State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah App. 1993), citing Ward v.
Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984)(emph. added),
aff'd
on remand, 776 P.2d 93 (Utah App. 1989), cert, granted,
783 P.2d 53
(Utah 1989), aff'd,
789 P.2d 757 (Utah 1990).
Each term in a statute should be interpreted according to
its usual and commonly accepted meaning. Utah County v.
Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1985)(footnotes omitted).
We presume that words are used in their ordinary sense. In
re adoption of M.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Utah App. 1987).
State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, at 993 (Utah App. 1993).
III.

THE LEGISLATURE'S POWER OVER PAROLE

Like the State Legislature, the Board of Pardons is a body
with both constitutional and statutory powers. But the authority
of the Utah Board of Pardons is not absolute and yields to state
or federal constitutional provisions.
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Article VII, Section 12(2) (a), Utah Constitution, provides:
The Board of Pardons, by majority vote and upon other conditions as provided by statute, may grant parole ... subject to
regulations as provided by statute.
That constitutional provision allows the Utah Legislature to
condition the power of the Utah Board of Pardons to grant parole,
etc., based on conditions provided by statute and subject the power
to parole to regulations provided by statute. Except for statutory
limitations pursuant to that constitutional provision and federal
constitutional limitations on the Board's power, the Board's power
in its constitutional and statutory realm would be almost plenary.
One statutory limitation of the Board of Pardon's discretion
is found at §77-27-10(2) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended which
contains mandatory language requiring the Utah Board of Pardons to
order sex offenders to "outpatient mental health counseling and
treatment." The District Court and the persons who are responsible
to represent the legal interests of the Utah Board of Pardons have
interpreted § 77-27-10(2) as only setting a minimum requirement to
be applied to sex offenders and that the statute can not prevent
the Utah Board of Pardons from paroling sex offenders to community
corrections centers for inpatient sexual therapy as a condition of
that parole.
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IV,

THE TERM "SHALL" AS MANDATORY LANGUAGE

In the recent Parole Rescission Hearing, another inmate raised
the same issue that is presented by this appeal. The Utah Board of
Pardons member cited to § 76-3-409 as a source of the Board's power
to order treatment for the sexual offender. However, the language
of that section, while somewhat ambiguous, appears to contemplate
that the court, not the Board of Pardons', orders such treatment.
Language used by the United States Supreme Court in their
opinion in Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S.
452, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1909, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989), adds substantial
strength to Petitioner/Appellant's position that UCA § 77-27-10(2)
always requires the Board of Pardons to order "outpatient mental
health counseling and treatment" as a condition of parole for sex
offender.
In that Thompson, 109 S.Ct. at page 1909, the Court says:
[1] Stated simply, "a State creates a protected liberty
interest by placing substantive limitations on official
discretion." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 249, 103
S.Ct. at 1747.
Then, at page 1910, the U.S. Supreme Court states:
We have also articulated a requirement, implicit in our
earlier decisions, that the regulations contain "explicitly
mandatory language," i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations substantive predicates are
present, a particular outcome must follow, in order to create
a liberty interest. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 471-72,
103 S.Ct., at 871-872. The regulations at issue in Hewitt
[v. Helm,] mandated that certain procedures be followed, and
"that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates." JEd. , at 472, 103 S.Ct., at 871.
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In Board of Pardons v. Alien, [482 U.S. 369, 107 S.Ct. 2425,
96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987)], the relevant statute used mandatory
language ('shall') to 'create a presumption that parole release will be granted when the designated findings are made, "
482 U.S., at 377-78, 107 S.Ct., at 2420-21, quoting Greenholtz
v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. at 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2106.
See also id. , at 11, 99 S.Ct., at 2105 (statute providing that
board "shall order" release unless one of four specified conditions is found). In sum, the use of "explicitly mandatory
language," in connection with the establishment of "specified
substantive predicates" to limit discretion, forces a conclusion that the State has created a liberty interest. Hewitt v.
Helm, 459 U.S., at 472, 103 S.Ct., at 871.
Implicit in Petitioner/Appellant's argument on appeal is the
position that § 77-27-10(2) uses the explicit mandatory language
("shall") to require the Board to always order "outpatient mental
health counseling and treatment" as a condition of a sex offender's
parole. That language appears to preclude the Utah Board of Pardon
from ordering an extended inpatient sexual therapy at a community
corrections center.
As previously stated, the Utah Board of Pardons could lawfully
achieve the same impact through the pre-parole use of the halfway
house sexual therapy program, followed by parole with the required
"outpatient mental health counseling and treatment" as a condition
of that parole.
The practical difference is that a program failure would not
become a per se parole violation. The Utah Board of Pardon's overreliance on determinations of sexual therapists as their grounds
for parole violations based on failure to successfully complete a
sex therapy program may also constitute an unlawful delegation of
18

Board of Pardon powers to those sex therapists.

Halfway

houses

are programs normally interposed between incarceration and parole.
Petitioner/Appellant does not dispute the power of the Department
of Corrections to transfer inmates to a Halfway House to complete
an extended, intensive inpatient sex therapy program before he is
entitled to parole.

Petitioner/Appellant believes the mandatory

language of UCA § 77-27-10(2) requires "outpatient mental health
counseling and treatment" and that requirement is inconsistent with
the Board of Pardon's discretion to order him to complete the same
type of extended, intensive inpatient sexual therapy at a community
corrections center as a special condition of his parole because the
Board of Pardons is only empowered to order "special conditions of
parole" that are "consistent with the laws of the State of Utah."
In the State of Utah's Reply Brief to Respondent's to Brief of
Amicus Curiae from Preece v. House, Case No. 920605 (Utah), counsel
for the State of Utah responded to the amici's argument that the
Utah Sentencing and Release Guideline be given the force of law
contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's dicta that they do not have
the force of law in Labrum v. Utah Board of Pardons, 227 Ut. Adv.
Rep.

30, 33

(Utah, filed December 6, 1993), the attorney who

represented the State of Utah argued that :
[t]he operative word is 'should' rather than 'shall'" [see
State's Reply Brief at page 2]. Later the State's attorney
explained his prior statement about the "operative effect"
of the terms 'should' and 'shall', stating that "The authors
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of the [Sentence and Release] Guidelines purposely used the
word 'should' rather than 'shall' to encourage the agencies
to comply rather than to coerce them into automatic application [of the Guidelines]• To date the legislature has not
chosen them presumptive. This Court is bound to give recognition of that fact. In Hewitt v. Helm, 459 U.S. 460, 471
(1982), the United States Supreme Court expressed the policy
rationale for refusing to import constitutional protection
to procedural guidelines like Utah's Sentencing and Release
Guidelines.
The creation of procedural guidelines to channel the
decision-making of prison officials is, in the view of
many experts in the field, a salutary development. It
would be ironic to hold that when a State embarks on
such desirable experimentation it thereby opens the
door to scrutiny ... while States that choose not to
adopt such procedural provision entirely avoid the
strictures of the Due Process Clause."
Hewitt v. Helm, 459 U.S. at 471.
V.

THE MEANING OF "OUTPATIENT" IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS

Chapter 27 of Title 77 neither distinguishes between or
defines the terminology "outpatient mental health counseling and
treatment" [from § 77-27-10(2)] or "inpatient" sex therapy [from
the community correctional center sexual therapy program].

But,

State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, at 271 (Utah App. 1990), included
the statement that an Adult Probation and Parole agent described
Community Corrections Centers as an "inpatient facility operated by
the [Utah] Department of Corrections."
Although § 62A-2-10K16) , Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended,
is not directly applicable in this context, it may provide guidance
as to what usual meaning of the term " [o]utpatient treatment" might
be.

It provides:
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individual, family, or group therapy or counseling designed
to improve or enhance social or psychological functioning
for those whose physical and emotional status allows them
to continue functioning in their usual living environment,
(emphasis added).
Therefore, paroling sex offenders to "inpatient residential
treatment centers" like the Community Corrections Centers cannot
equate to the "out patient mental health counseling" mandated by
§ 77-27-10(2).

State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 2270 (Utah App. 1990)

(describing community corrections centers as "inpatient residential
treatment centers").
VI.

FEDERAL LAW, NOT STATE LAW, DEFINES THE PROCESS DUE

In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
539-541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1492-1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the argument that became known as "the
bitter with the sweet" that had its genesis in Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 152, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1643-1644, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974).
Arnett v. Kennedy involved a former federal employee's challenge to
the procedures by which he was dismissed.

The Arnett opinion

states:
The employee's statutory right is not a guarantee against
removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee
as enforced by the procedures which Congress has designated
for the determination of cause. . . . [W]here the grant of
a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must
take the bitter with the sweet.
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The Loudermill Court rejected that argument, stating:
... the "bitter with the sweet" approach misconceives the
constitutional guarantee. If a clearer holding is needed,
we provide it today. The point is straightforward: the Due
Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights life, liberty, and property - cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures... "Property"
cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due
process "is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not
to confer a property interest, it may not constitutionally
authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards... In short,
once it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies,
"the question remains what process is due." Morissev v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d
484 (1972) .
An essential principle of due process is that deprivation
of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and
opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 656, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). We
have described "the root requirement" of the Due Process
Clause as being "that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant
property interest." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)(emphasis in
original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542, 91 S.Ct.
1586, 1591, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) . This principle requires
"some kind of hearing" prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in his employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. [564],
at 569-570, 92 S.Ct. [2701], 2705, [33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)];
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 599, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698,
33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972).
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-541,
105 S.Ct. 1487, 1492-1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).
Where a government employee has a property interest in public
employment, then temporary suspension without pay would not be de
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minimus and would implicate protected property interests. See

e.g.

Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1985) and the cases cited
therein.

An entitlement to a "privilege" implicates due process

principles.

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 90 S.Ct. 1011,

1017-1018 (1970)(extent to which procedural due process must be
afforded is influenced by the extent to which the recipient may
be "condemned to suffer grievous loss").
VII.

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Petitioner/Appellant alleges that the Utah Board of Pardons'
creation of a policy or practice that imposes a parole condition
that directly conflicts with existing constitutional and statutory
rights to another parole condition triggers the protections of the
"substantive due process" component of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it constitutes an arbitrary use of governmental power for
purposes of oppression.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
also "contains a substantive component, sometimes referred to as
"substantive due process," which bars certain arbitrary government
actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662,

88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).
[B]y barring certain governmental actions regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,
it serves to prevent governmental power from being used
for oppression.
Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662, at 665.
23

Like specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, "substantive
due process is violated at the moment the harm occurs [and
therefore] the existence of a post-deprivation state remedy
should not have any bearing on whether a cause of action exists under § 1983.
E.g.

Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citing cases).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, this Court should grant

the Appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
Refiled on this 1st day of July, 1994.
HILTON & STEED, P.C.

David S.' "SteecT
Attorney for
Petitioner/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, first-class postage prepaid,
to the following record counsel for Respondent/Appellee on the
1st day of July, 1994:
JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

David S. St'eed
Attorney for
Petitioner/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A - PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Nicholas V. Banner, #17049
Attorney, Pro Se
Fremont Correctional Center
2588 West 2365 South
West Valley City, Utah 84119

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NICHOLAS V. BANNER,
Petitioner,

]
|
]|

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS

i
]

Civil No.

v.
STATE OF UTAH, BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLE,
Respondent.
Petitioner Nicholas Vaughn Banner, pro se, pursuant to Rule
65B(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions this Court
to grant him a writ of habeas corpus, and states:
1.

Petitioner Nicholas Vaughn Banner is a citizen of the

State of Utah, residing in Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

Petitioner is currently being held as a prisoner at the

Fremont Correctional Center, 2588 West 2365 South, West Valley
City, Utah 84119, as prisoner number 17049.

Fremont Correctional

Center is a state correctional center operated by the State of
Utah, Department of Corrections.

3.
the

Respondent Board of Pardons and Parole is charged with

authority of

determining when and under what

conditions

Petitioner may be released from his imprisonment, subject to Title
77, Chapter 27 of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, as Amended,
and other laws of the State of Utah.
4.

Petitioner is being held pursuant to two convictions and

two concurrent sentences of one to fifteen years and one year
entered after jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court in
and

for Salt Lake County by the Honorable Frank G. Noel on

September 10, 1992. The convictions are sexual abuse of a child in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1, and lewdness involving a
child in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5, and were entered
in Third Judicial District Court, Case No. 831916801. See Judgment
and Commitment Order, attached hereto as Exhibit "1".
5.

Such restraint is unlawful in that effective December 14,

1993, it was determined and duly ordered by Respondent that
Petitioner "be paroled from the punishment and sentence heretofore
imposed upon him." See Order of Parole, attached hereto as Exhibit
"2".
6.

That Petitioner agreed "to abide by all conditions of

parole as set forth in [the Parole Agreement] and any additional
conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of Pardons,
consistent with the laws of the State of Utah." The first "special
2

condition" of parole being that Petitioner enter and "successfully
complete Halfway House Program."

See Parole Agreement, attached

hereto as Exhibit "3".
7.

Said "Halfway House Program" condition of parole is a

twelve-month intensive in-patient sex offender program at a state
correctional facility, which unlawfully countermands Respondent's
Order that Petitioner "be paroled from the punishment and sentence
heretofore imposed upon him."

See Exhibit "2". It further flies

in the face of Section 77-27-10(2) of the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure, which states:
If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to
violate Section ... 76-5-404.1 ... (the section of which
Petitioner was convicted of having violated), is released
on parole, the board shall order outpatient mental health
counseling and treatment as a condition of parole
(emphasis added).
8.

Upon discovery that the condition of parole in dispute is

not "consistent with the laws of the State of Utah," Petitioner
related this fact, in writing, to the Assistant Attorney General
Kirk Torgensen, with whom Petitioner had previously discussed his
concerns over the condition, and requested that Mr. Torgensen
suggest to his client
amended accordingly.

(the Respondent) that the condition be
See letter of Nicholas V. Banner to Kirk

Torgensen, dated 8 November 1993, attached hereto as Exhibit "4".
9.

Petitioner's letter to Mr. Torgensen was referred to

Assistant Attorney

General

James H. Beadles
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for

a response.

Mr. Beadles contends that Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-10(2) "requires
the Board to order outpatient therapy but it does not limit its
authority to order inpatient therapy."

See letter of James H.

Beadles to Nicholas V. Banner dated 29 November 1993, attached
hereto as Exhibit "5". Mr. Beadles' interpretation of the statute
is contradictory, and is not accepted by Petitioner.
10.

Subsequently, Petitioner wrote directly to Respondent and

requested that the in-patient sex-offender program condition of his
parole be amended for the reasons that it is contrary to the Order
of Parole, in violation of state law, and in conflict with the
Parole Agreement that Petitioner abide by all conditions of parole,
consistent with state law.

See letter of Nicholas V. Banner to

Board of Pardons Chairman Michael R. Sibbett dated 10 December
1993, attached hereto as Exhibit "6".
11.

Petitioner's parole release date of December 14, 1993,

however, has since come and gone, without the unlawful condition of
parole complained of herein being changed by Respondent, causing
Petitioner's current imprisonment to be in flagrant violation of
his constitutionally protected liberty interest in obtaining parole
release "from the punishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon
him", on 14 December 1993, and under lawful conditions, as per the
Order of Parole.

See Exhibit "2".
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12.

The legality of the restraint has not heretofore been

adjudged.
13.

No previous application for a writ has been heretofore

made.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests:
1.

That the Court issue a writ, requiring Respondent to

appear with the person of Nicholas Vaughn Banner forthwith, and to
serve and file his answer to the Complaint at or before such time;
2.

That at

such time, the Court proceed

to

hear and

determine the legality of such restraint and upon a determination
that Nicholas Vaughn Banner is illegally or unlawfully restrained,
order

the

release

and

discharge

of

Nicholas

Vaughn

Banner

forthwith; and
3.

That Petitioner, who remains indigent, be allowed to

proceed without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments.
DATED:

December

, 1993.

Nicholas V. Banner
Attorney, Pro Se
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CERTIFICATE OF PRO SE COUNSEL
Nicholas Vaughn Banner, pro se, hereby certifies that the
statements of fact in the foregoing Petition are true to his
knowledge, and that statements made on information and belief are
true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Nicholas V. Banner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of December, 1993, I

caused to be mailed, via first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus to the following;
Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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EXHIBIT "1"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH.
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

vs.
N I C H O L A S VAUGHN BANNER

fUSP)

Defendant.

j
f
\

f>««w«
Count No. .
Honorable .

(

r.lArk

1

Reporter

J

Railiff
0*»t*»

831916801
1
FRANK G. NOEL
P. JONES
E. MIDGLEY
J . BOND
SEPT. 4 , 1 9 9 2

D The motion of
. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by 5? a jury; • the court; D plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of
SEXUAL ABUSE OF A C H R P
a felony
of the 2 n d degree, Q a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by J L GARCIA t and the State being represented hy H . LFMCKF isnow adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
D
&
n
D
D
K)

to a maximum mandatory term of
. years and which may be for life;
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $.
M
TF ANY

K) such sentence is to run concurrently with COUNT 2
Q such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) -

are hereby dismissed.

h D E F T TO R E C E I V E C R E D I T FOR * 8 Y E A R S & 9 MONTHS A!RFAHY

SFRVFn*

D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
& Commitment shall issue
FORTHWITH
^
f
DATED this
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy Countv Attornev

IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT) TO
SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL

Plaintiff,
vs.
NICHOLAS

VAUGHN BANNER

(USP)

Defendant.

831916801
Case No.
Count No. . 2
Honorable . FRANK G. NOEL
P. JONES
Clerk
F. MIDGLEY
Rpnnrfftr
J . ROND
Railiff
SEPT. 4 . 1992
Date .

_

. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
• The motion of.
impose sentence accordingly is • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by ffla jury; • the court; • plea of guilty; • plea
of no contest; of the offense of
LEWDNESS
a class «fl
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and represented by
MAMMY PARTTA
, and the State being represented by
HOWARD I FMTKF
,j S
now adjudged guilty of the above offense,
XL3
XC3
•
•

is now sentenced to a term in the Salt Lake County Jail,
of
1 2
months;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $
;
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $

to

COUNT 1
X$ such sentence is to run concurrently with
• such sentence is to run consecutively with
• upon motion of • State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s)

•

are hereby dismissed.

D Defendant is granted * s t 2 y 0 f t h e above (C jail) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this
Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Probation and
Parole for the period of
pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
• Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to be confined and
imprisoned in the Salt Lake County Jail in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
XQt Commitment shall issue
FORTHWITH
_~
DATED this

i__dayof

^J?U

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Defense Counsel

Deputy County Attorney

Page

of.

JUDGE'S PRISON TERM R E C O M M E N D A T I O N
Pursuant to the provisions
is^pn< nf Section 77-18-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 1980,1 recommend that
the defendant serve
months-prior to release or parole
Comments, including mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
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EXHIBIT "2"

Members
Norman H. Bang«rUr
Governor
H. L (Prft) Haun
Chairman

Donald E, Btanchard
Michael R. Slbbett
William L Peters

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER OF PAROLE
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 00025683
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 17049
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF BANNER, NICHOLAS VAUGHN

This matter of application for parole, termination of sentence, or
expiration of sentence having come before the Utah State Board of Pardons
in a regularly scheduled hearing on the 3rd day of January, 1991, and the
applicant appearing in person or having waived in writing the right to
appearance and the Board having heard the case, issues the following order:
It is hereby ordered that BANNER, NICHOLAS VAUGHN be paroled from the
punishment and sentence heretofore imposed upon him/her by a judge of the
Third District Court in and for the County or Salt Lake for the crime(s) of
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILD, 2nd degree felony, Expiration 12/02/98.
The parole shall not become effective until 14th day of December, 1993.
The applicant agrees to the conditions of parole and evidences his agreement by
signing the parole agreement. The parole agreement or contract shall be
administered by duly authorized agents of the Utah State Department of
Corrections for the Utah State Board of Pardons.
It is further ordered that if and in the event the above named applicant
shall be guilty of any infractions of the rules and regulations of the Utah
State Prison or shall fail or refuse to perform duties as assigned by the Utah
State Prison or is found to be in violation of any other law or the State of
Utah prior to the effective date of said parole, then this Order of Parole is
revoked and becomes null and void.
Dated this 3rd day of January, 1991.
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this
8th day of January, 1991, reduced its decision in this matter to writing and
hereby affix my signature as Chairman for and on behalf of the State of
Utah, Board of Pardons.

4?
H . L : HAUN, Cha/rnfan

EXHIBIT "3"

lUmb«n
Normin H. Bang#rt»f
Governor
H. L (Pttt) Haun
Chairman

Donald E. Blanchard
Michaal R. Slbbott
William L Potart

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PAROLE AGREEMENT
I, BANNER, NICHOLAS VAUGHN
agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of
the Utah State Department of Corrections and be accountable for my" actions and
conduct to Utah State Corrections, according to this Agreement.
I further agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this
Agreement and any additional conditions as set forth by the Utah State Board of
Pardons, consistent with the laws of the State of Utah, I fully understand
that the violation of this Agreement and/or any conditions thereof or any new
conviction for a crime may result in action by the Board causing my parole to
be revoked or my parole period to start over.
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE
On the day of my release from the institution or confinement,
I will report to my assigned Parole Agent, unless otherwise
approved in writing.
2. RESIDENCE:
I shall establish a residence of record and shall reside at
such residence in fact and on record and shall not change my
lace of residence without knowledge of my Parole Agent; and
shall not leave the State of Utah without prior written
authorization from my Parole Agent. It is hereby acknowledged
that should I leave the State of Utah without written
authorization from my Parole Agent that I hereby waive
extradition, from any state in which I may be found, to the
State of Utah.
I shall obey all State and Federal laws and municipal
3. CONDUCT:
ordinances at all times.
REPORT:
I shall make written or in person reports to my Parole Agent
by the fifth of each and every month or as directed and I
snail permit visits to my place of residence as required by
' Agent
'
' for
"
'
' compliance
* '
1th
my Parole
the purpose of" insuring
wit
the conditions of parole.
I will seek and maintain full-time employment unless I am
EMPLOYMENT:
participating in an educational or therapy program approved
fey my Parole Agent.
I agree to allow a Parole Agent to search my person,
SEARCH:
residence, vehicle, or any other property under my control,
without a warrant, any time day or nieht, upon reasonable
suspicion as ascertained by a Parole Agent, to insure
compliance with the conditions of my parole.
I snail not own. possess, or have under my control or in my
WEAPONS:
custody any explosives, rirearems, or any dangerous weapons
as defined in Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-10-501, as
amended.
8. ASSOCIATION: I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner
which can reasonably be expected to result in, or which has
resulted in criminal or illegal activity.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS: I shall:
"7^51 Successfully complete Halfway House Program.
y j£ 2 Not consume or possess any alcohol.
1 > ^ 3 Take antabuse as prescribed by a physician.
Y'jg ^ Abide by Sex Offender Special Conditions Group A.
iJjr',5 Remit fine.
jjfcb
Successfully complete ISP if available where residing.
1. RELEASE:

?

I have read, understand an agree to the above conditions and I hereby
acknowledge receipt #f a c |py of this Agreement.
WITNESSED BY:

wUI/^

TITLE:

this /Xr7^)

day oi

Q*U.

SIGNED: ^KJ
Parolee
ADDRESS:

Chairman, Board of Pardons
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EXHIBIT "5"

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOHN F. CLARK
Counsel to the Attorney General

CAROL CLAWSON
Solicitor General

REED RICHARDS
Chief Deputy Attorney General

PALMER DEPAULIS
Director of Public Policy & Communications

29 November 1993

Nicholas V. Banner
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Subject:

Your letter of 8 November 1993 regarding sex offender therapy

Dear Mr. Banner:
Kirk Torgensen has referred your letter to me for a response. The substance of your
complaint, as I understand it, challenges the Board of Pardons' authority to order you into
inpatient sex offender therapy. You refer to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 to allow the Board
to order outpatient therapy only. That interpretation misconstrues the statute. The statute
requires the Board to order outpatient therapy but it does not limit its authority to order inpatient
therapy. That is, the statute sets a minimum (outpatient therapy) but does not restrict the Board
from going beyond that minimal requirement in certain cases. Obviously, your case must be one
of those cases in which the Board felt it necessary to order inpatient therapy. This is a proper
exercise of the Board's lawful discretion.
I hope this letter is responsive to your concerns.
Respectfully,

James H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General
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EXHIBIT "6"

Nicholas V. Banner, #17049
P. 0. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
December 10, 1993

Mr. Michael R. Sibbett, Chairman
State of Utah, Board of Pardons
448 East 6400 South, Suite 300
Murray, Utah 84107
Re:

Parole of Nicholas V. Banner, U.S.P. No. 17049;
OBSCIS No. 00025683

Dear Mr. Sibbett:
By order of the Board of Pardons, I am to be released on parole
from the Utah State Prison on 14 December 1993, with the first condition
of parole being that I enter and complete an in-patient sex offender
program at a community correctional center. In the light of documented
safety-concerns that I have over my placement into such a setting,
eleven months ago I requested that the Board reconsider this requirement, but no change was made. Since that time, for various other valid
reasons, similar requests to have the condition deleted or amended were
made in my behalf by a clinical_psychologist, an attorney, a case
worker, and a parole agent; nevertheless, all were denied without
explanation. Therefore, notwithstanding its unfeasability as applied to
my situation, I was left with the distinct impression that I either
agree to said condition of parole or face forfeiture of my release date
— on this basis, I agreed (see enclosed signed copy of Parole
Agreement).
I have since discovered, however, that the condition of my parole
requiring further confinement under the current sentence, for the
purpose of entering into an in-patient sex offender program, cannot
legally stand, based upon the following: (1) that by Order of Parole
(copy enclosed), I am to ".. .be paroled from the punishment and sentence
heretofore imposed upon [me]..." (emphasis mine); (2) that by legislative mandate, when a sex offender "...is released on parole, the board
shall order outpatient mental health counseling and treatment as a
condition of parole", Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, § 77-27-10(2)
(emphasis mine); and {3) that by Parole Agreement (copy enclosed),
"I...agree to abide by all conditions of parole as set forth in this
Agreement and any additional conditions as set forth by the Utah State
Board of Pardons, consistent with the laws of the State of Utah"
(emphas is mine).
To be "consistent with the laws of the State of Utah", it would
appear from the foregoing analysis that the condition in dispute should
be amended accordingly.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
Nicholas V. Banner
cc:

Brian M. Barnard, Esq.

ADDENDUM B - ORDER OF DISMISSAL

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Nicholas B. Banner,
Petitioner,

CASE NO: 930907321 HC
vs.
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL
Board of Pardons and Parole
Respondent.

The court has reviewed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and finds it to be
frivolous on its face for the following reasons:
The provision of the Utah Code relied upon by petitioner, ie, 77-27-10(2) is not a
limitation on the Board's authority except insofar as it requires the Board to order, at a
minimum, outpatient therapy. The Board is also required by law to exercise their discretion in
such a way as to reasonably protect the community and to assist the offender to lead a lawabiding life. The referenced provision of the code in no way prevents the Board from ordering
inpatient treatment as a condition of probation.
For these reasons the court hereby dismisses this petition.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

J>

day of January, 1994.

Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge

^ f c r , .
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BANNER V. BOARD OF PARDONS

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal,
postage prepaid, to the following this

Q

day of January, 1994.

Nicholas V. Banner
Petitioner
Fremont Correctional Center
2588 West 2365 South
West Valley City, Utah 84119
James H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

o

ADDENDUM C - NOTICE OF APPEAL

rC<

KB 0 2 f994
Nicholas V. Banner, #17049
Attorney Pro Se
Fremont Correctional Center
2588 West 2365 South
West Valley City, Utah 84119

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH
NOTICE OF APPEAL

NICHOLAS V. BANNER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.

Trial Court No. 930907321HC

STATE OF UTAH, BOARD OF
PARDONS & PAROLE,

Judge Frank 6. Noel

Defendant/Appellee.
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, Nicholas
V, Banner, Pro Se, appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals the final
Order of the Honorable Frank G. Noel entered in this matter on
January 5, 1994.
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment.
DATED:

February

, 1994.

Nicholas V. Banner
Attorney, Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of February, 1994, I

caused to be mailed, via first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true
and

correct

copy of the

foregoing

following:
James K. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellee

2

Notice of Appeal

to the

ADDENDUM D - STATUTORY PROVISIONS

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Section 77-27-10(2), Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended, says:
If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to
violate Section . . . 76-5-404.1 . . . [the Section that
the Petitioner/Appellant was convicted of violating], is
released on parole, the board [of Pardons] shall order
outpatient mental health counseling and treatment as a
condition of parole (emphasis added).

2.

§ 62A-2-10K16) , Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended, defines
M

[o]utpatient treatment" as:

individual, family, or group therapy or counseling designed
to improve or enhance social or psychological functioning
for those whose physical and emotional status allows them
to continue functioning in their usual living environment,
(emphasis added).

ADDENDUM E - CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

en£o*ce \ z e n s of £

fourteen* *°

»^iit^ ^

" .

^eU-es - / ^

gi vetl (c) ^
^ V B

1

e

^

^

e

^

, 2 of * e «a*

t

i

*

.

- '

nceedings/^/dissent °J
C e a s e , ^ f i i e d as P^°V
^

^

*e

0rder

toy

grant - s P ^ - ^

o£

-f

^nted

sta
al

e

131 o£ convictions £ a ^
*
board-g
^
cases °* t i o n on ""P session
n e resv
ided m
C
°* °Tb%°^ Tinulor d e t e ^ f £ e n s e as V«

^

£* seC t
n,

